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SUMMARY
Organisms compete for limited resources to reproduce. Reproduction depends on
behaviors that are modified by abiotic and biotic factors, including the behavior of
other organisms. This thesis adopts and extends evolutionary game theory to un-
derstand the coupled dynamics of individual behavior and resources. In doing so,
the work is motivated by the example of the Tragedy of the Commons introduced
by Garret Hardin in which individuals, each acting in their own self-interest, over-
use resources and lead to the collapse of the commons. Although Hardin claimed
that the TOC is inevitable, there are many examples from ecology to economics that
offer alternative outcomes. An explanation for this gap was recently proposed in a
mean-field model of evolutionary games coupled to environmental feedback in which
depletion of resources can change individual behavior, thus leading to the aversion of
the tragedy. This thesis extends this continuous model of game-environment feedback
to address three motivating questions: 1) How does demographic noise and spatial in-
teractions shape the spatiotemporal dynamics of the system, 2) How does the relative
speed of strategy and environment dynamics affect TOC, 3) What new insights can
we learn regarding public good production in microbial systems when game and envi-
ronment are reciprocally coupled. Our approach to answer these questions leverages
a derivation of individual-based game rules that can recapitulate feedback given both
demographic noise and spatially explicit interactions. These games rules recapitulate
the mean-field model in the large system limit. Individual-based simulations of the
game yield multiple findings. First, spatial and non-spatial simulations give different
population dynamics with the same simulation parameter sets, suggesting that spa-
tial interactions can shift regimes where TOCs occur. Second, the spatially explicit
system shows coherent spatial-temporal patterns, including the expansion of clusters
of resources and strategies. Additional findings highlight the role of diffusivity and
xv
time-scales in modulating the coupled fates of behaviors and environment. Overall,
the work helps identify consequences of the mutual feedback between behavior and




Living together on the same planet, interactions among organisms and between or-
ganisms and their environments are inevitable. The simplest forms of interactions are
those involving only two organisms. Pairwise interactions between organisms can be
roughly categorized into several types based on the consequence on two sides [1]. The
interacting organisms can both suffer from the interaction, e.g. as during competi-
tion. Sometimes benefit for one side comes from the harm of the other side. Predation
and parasitism are two instances [2, 3, 4]. Commensalism, in which there is a net
benefit for one side without loss from the other side is also possible [5, 6]. Moreover,
mutualism denotes the case when the two sides can both benefit from the interactions
in some [7, 8].
Among the types of interactions mentioned, the mutually beneficial interactions,
such cooperative interactions, are of particular interest because the interactions are
susceptible to invasion by cheaters. In game theory, cheaters are defined as individu-
als who do not cooperate but take advantage of the benefit coming from cooperating
individuals [9, 10, 11]. The risk of cheating and its possible negative outcomes can be
further illustrated by an example Garrett Hardin described in his paper in 1968 [12].
Hardin postulated a situation where there is a common grassland (the “commons”)
every shepherd can access. The shepherds are able to maintain a herd of cows of
reasonable size if they all cooperate and use the grassland in moderation. However,
a shepherd will benefit more by grazing more cows on the grassland. A rational but
selfish shepherd would choose to put as many cows as possible to utilize the grassland
most. Given a group of selfish shepherds (cheaters, or defectors hereafter), the grass-
land would soon be depleted due to their collective defective behavior. Hardin termed
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this situation as “the tragedy of the commons” (TOC) and argued it was inevitable.
Yet, cooperation still seems to be ubiquitous despite the existence of defectors.
Theoretical analysis and field studies have shown that a sustainable system of man-
aging the commons without regulations from a central authority are possible. By
deliberately arranging the timing of utilizing the commons with regulations from au-
thorities at the intermediate levels, individuals can continue to derive benefits from
a common resource [13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
In this thesis, we aim to examine an additional class of mechanisms by which
cooperation persists in spite of the risk of being defeated by defectors. The core
idea is to consider a class of game theory problems in which the game affects the
environmental state which, in turn, affects the game. This feedback lies outside the
scope of most approaches to game theory analysis focusing on static games. The
core innovation is to examine such games in a spatial context. To do so, we take the
following approach.
In Chapter 2, we introduce game theory, a mathematical framework to study
how rationale individuals choose a strategy, e.g., to cooperate or to defect, based on
their strategy-dependent payoffs. We also introduce replicator dynamics, a mean-
field ordinary differential equation (ODE) that captures the evolutionary dynamics
of change in strategy frequency assuming each individual has an equal chance to
play games with another in the system. Further, we derive a set of individual-based
game rules and prove that it can recapitulate the replicator dynamics at the mean-
field limit with the master equation approach. Examining the convergence from the
macroscopic individual-based game rules developed to the population-level replicator
dynamics helps disentangle the effects of demographic noises and spatial coupling
on the system dynamics from the impact of other possible individual-based updating
rules. The game rules developed here serve as a foundation for the following chapters,
where we use individual-based model (IBM) to explore the strategy dynamics in the
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spatial and non-spatial context under the influence of variations in the environment.
In Chapter 3, we briefly review a recent ODE model on coevolutionary dynamics
between the environment and the strategy [18]. In this model, the payoffs of the games
are functions of the environment. Namely, individuals are able to adjust their strate-
gies given an accurate perception of the environment. The individuals are assumed to
favor defect when the environment is abundant but could play different games when
the environment is depleted. By exploring possible payoffs when the environment
is depleted, Weitz et. al. proved aversion of TOC is possible. The analysis of the
ODE model also reveals the existence of an oscillating TOC (o-TOC), a dynamical
behavior that the environment oscillates with increasing amplitudes until approach-
ing the extremum. We construct a hybrid in silico model that leverages the game
rules derived in Chapter 2 and updates the environment with numerical integration to
simulate the coevolutionary dynamics including demographic noise. The non-spatial
individual-based simulations recapitulate the ODE solution, further confirming the
game rules are capable of representing 2-by-2 symmetric games of different types,
even when the payoff matrix is dependent on another variable. The individual-based
game rules can be quickly adapted to spatial simulations by limiting game players to
be in the vicinity of each other. By realizing the game rules on a two-dimensional
(2D) lattice, we find the spatial coupling can shift the domain where a TOC can be
averted. We also identify that spatial coevolutionary games can at least display three
kinds of spatiotemporal dynamics with different environment diffusivity Dn. The
spatial pair correlation analysis on the spatial-temporal dynamics indicates how the
value of Dn alters the spatial-temporal dynamics.
In Chapter 4, we further investigate the effect of relative speed of strategy dynam-
ics and environment dynamics. Adopting the same simulation model as described in
Chapter 3, we find that the dynamical behavior of the IBM recapitulates the ODE
solution with only one exception. An o-TOC occurs given an IBM in a situation
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that generally leads to a TOC. In the case of slow strategy dynamics, the chance of
winning for cooperators and defectors becomes comparable, and the stochastic nature
of the individual-based game rules make it possible for cooperators to invade even
when the environment is not ideal for them. We also run spatial simulations with
several different combinations of Dn and different speed parameter, which controls
the relative speed of strategy and environment. We again find system dynamics di-
verge from ODE prediction and non-spatial simulations due to spatial coupling. By
performing spatial simulations with different speed parameters, we find the simula-
tions with Dn = 1 are most vulnerable to a TOC and provide an possible explanation
for it. The spatial temporal structure and spatial pair-correlation function reveals
slow environment dynamics leads to delay between cooperator invasion and local en-
vironment enhancement. Hence, a slow responding environment can sometimes result
in spatial anti-correlation between strategy and environment dynamics as found in
simulations with a low Dn. In contrast, a fast responding environment leads to highly
localized environment distributions, contributing to the decrease of cooperators and
environment clusters in size.
Up until Chapter 4, we have only considered scenarios in which the environment
responds to change in strategies. In Chapter 5, we also take intrinsic dynamics of
the environment into account, that is, the dynamics without the impact of individual
strategies. We mainly focus on the case of an exponentially decaying resource, i.e.,
without autonomous regenerative capacity. Following the process in the paper by
Tilman et. al. [19], we use the coupled ODEs for coevolutionary dynamics with a
decaying environment as the basis of updating rules for the environment. In doing
so, we confirm that our non-spatial hybrid simulation model still captures the fea-
tures of the ODE model given intrinsic environment dynamics. In contrast, spatial
simulations reveal that spatial coupling shifts the system dynamics in a way we have
not found in the previous chapters. While we attribute the increasing amplitudes in
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oscillating dynamics to strong spatial coupling in Chapter 3, we find this is not the
case for systems with an intrinsically decaying environment. Rather, a large value of
environmental diffusivity seems to dampen the oscillations in the spatial simulations
of the model considered in this chapter.
In summary, evolutionary game theory and replicator has been used to study how
the frequency of strategists change over time. Building upon prior work, this thesis
explores how feedback between game and environment in a spatially explicit context




THEORETICAL BASIS OF INDIVIDUAL-BASED GAMES
Adapted from Y.-H. Lin, and J. S. Weitz. (2019). Spatial Interactions and Oscillatory
Tragedies of the Commons. Physical review letters 122(14), 148102.
2.1 Introduction
Game theory is a mathematical framework to understand the actions of rationale
individuals and of populations of individuals with distinct strategies [20]. Essentially,
a game can be described by a payoff matrix, of which elements are the payoffs to
each player involved in a game with a set of strategies. One of the simplest forms is
a symmetric, 2-by-2 game. The term “symmetric” means the payoffs only depend on
the strategies the players chose. By 2-by-2, it means only two strategies are available,
and only two players are involved in a game. The payoff matrix of a 2-by-2 symmetric





The elements aij denotes the payoff awarded to the focal player when it plays strategy
i and its opponent plays strategy j. In this thesis, strategy 1 is to cooperate and
strategy 2 is to defect. A rational individual always chooses the strategy with a
better payoff.
A symmetric 2-by-2 game can have a different outcome determined by the payoffs,
and we can classify the games based on the relative values of aij. Some of the
classical types of games are 1.) When a11 > a12 ≥ a21 > a22, the players would
choose to cooperate regardless of the opponent’s strategy and the overall payoff is
better for both parties if they cooperate. This kind of game is called a harmony
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game. 2.) When a11 > a12 ≥ a22 > a21, the focal player prefers to play the same
strategy as its opponent, but the cooperation of both parties lead to better overall
payoff than defection. This kind of game is called a stag hunt game. 3.) When
a21 > a22 ≥ a12 > a11, the focal player prefers to play the opposite strategy as its
opponent, but the cooperative player gets a better payoff. This kind of game is called
a hawk-dove game or a snow-drift game [21, 22]. 4.) When a21 > a11 ≥ a22 > a21,
both player would choose to defect regardless of the opponent’s strategy, but the
overall payoff is actually better if they both choose to cooperate. This kind of game
is called a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game [22, 23].
The PD game is of particular interest because it is the situation that leads to a
social dilemma termed as ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (TOC) by Garrett Hardin [12].
The social dilemma arises when two individuals choose amongst distinct strategies to
utilize a limited public good. Both individuals receive the maximal combined benefit
if they utilize the public good with restraint, i.e., if they ‘cooperate’. However, each
receives the maximal personal benefit if they utilize the public good without restraint,
i.e., if they ‘defect’, while their opponent cooperates. As a consequence, individuals
acting rationally will cheat leaving all worse off. Hardin argued that such a TOC is
inevitable [12].
Evolutionary dynamics arising from a TOC dilemma can be modeled in terms
of changes in the frequencies of individuals from two populations. Individuals in-
teract and receive payoffs that depend on their strategy and the strategy of their
opponent [21]. In replicator dynamics [24], the payoff represents a relative fitness
which determines the growth of cooperators, with frequency x, and of defectors, with
frequency 1− x, i.e.,
ẋ = x(1− x)(rC(x,A)− rD(x,A)). (2.2)
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The values rC and rD denote the context-dependent fitness payoff to cooperators and
defectors respectively, given the payoff matrix A = [ R ST P ], where rC = Rx+S(1− x),
rD = Tx + P (1− x), such that R denotes the reward to cooperation, T denotes the
temptation to cheat, S denotes the sucker’s payoff, and P denotes the punishment
given mutual defection. Plugging rC(x) and rD(x) into Eq. 2.2, it becomes
ẋ = x(1− x) ((R− T )x+ (S − P )(1− x)) , (2.3)
and a TOC occurs when T > R, P > S, and P < R, namely, a prisoners’ dilemma.
This 2-by-2, symmetric game model forms the basis for our development and anal-
ysis of an individual-based framework to assess the influence of noise and spatially
explicit interactions on the emergent dynamics. In this chapter, we derive the ex-





from the master equation:
ẋ = x(1− x) [(k1 − k3)x+ (k2 − k4)(1− x)] . (2.4)
We recover the replicator dynamics of the coevolutionary model when k1 = R(n),
k2 = S(n), k3 = T (n), and k4 = P (n). Hence, transition rates are a function of
resource- and social-context dependent payoffs. We also show that, in contrast, mean
field dynamics derived via a two-player individual-based model formulation (IBM2)
result in a logistic dependency on x distinct from the cubic nonlinearity in Eq. 2.3.
2.2 Derivation of individual-based game rules recovering replicator dy-
namics
Here we derive the individual based game rules that are able to recover replicator
dynamics
x′ = x (1− x) (rC(x, n)− rD(x, n)) , (2.5)
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in the continuous limit. The time is scaled by parameter ε for more compact expres-
sion. The normalized time t
ε
will be denoted as τ hereafter. We express the time
derivation with respect to normalized time with the prime symbol. We postulate
that individuals undergo a birth-death process: a focal player that wins against its
opponent in a game can reproduce a new individual with the same strategy and re-
place (A) another random player in the system or (B) the opponent. Here we show
the derivation process of the scenario where a game involves three players (A), which
recapitulates the form of replicator dynamics first. The game rules involving three
player in a game is termed ‘IBM3’ in the following chapters. We then show the
derivation of a similar process involving two individuals in which reproduction, when
it occurs, always replaces the opponent. The game rules involving only two players
is termed ‘IBM2’ in the following chapters.
2.2.1 Individual-based rules involving 3 players in a game
We write the events in a chemical reaction form with reaction rates ki. The total
number of players in the system is constant as a result of the birth-death process,
N = nC + nD, where nC and nD denote the number of cooperators and defectors
respectively. With C denoting a cooperator and D denoting a defector, the possible
















C + D + D
k2−→ C + D + C
D + C + C
k3−→ D + C + D
D + D + C
k4−→ D + D + D
(2.6)
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The transition rates of Eq. 2.6 are
T(nC + 1|nC) = k1 · nC ·
randomly choosing




a random D to
be replaced︷ ︸︸ ︷
nD
N − 1
+k2 · nC ·
randomly choosing




a random D to
be replaced︷ ︸︸ ︷
nD
N − 1
T(nC − 1|nC) = k3 · nD ·
randomly choosing




a random C to
be replaced︷ ︸︸ ︷
nC
N − 1
+k4 · nD ·
randomly choosing




a random C to





The terms in the above equations describe the change in number of two types of
players in a probabilistic perspective: there are nC (nD) cooperators (defectors) in
the system, each of which has probability to pick another player, either a cooperator
(nC−1
N−1 ) or a defector (
nD−1
N−1 ), as an opponent. At each time increment, the focal
player can produce a new individual with reaction rate ki∆τ . All players other than
the focal player in the system has an equal chance to be replaced by the newborn




N−1 ). Combining the transition probability of all the possible events listed
above, the master equation that governs the change in nC is
P (nC , τ + ∆τ) = P (nC , τ) + T(nC |nC − 1)P(nC − 1, τ)∆τ + T(nC |nC + 1)P(nC + 1, τ)∆τ
− T(nC + 1|nC)P(nC , τ)∆τ − T(nC − 1|nC)P(nC , τ)∆τ +O(∆τ 2).
(2.8)
Rearranging the master equation Eq. 2.8, dividing both sides by ∆τ and taking ∆τ
to be infinitesimal yields
P′ (nC , τ) = T(nC |nC − 1)P(nC − 1, τ) + T(nC |nC + 1)P(nC + 1, τ)
−T(nC + 1|nC)P(nC , τ)− T(nC − 1|nC)P(nC , τ).
(2.9)
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To examine if the master equation derived from the individual-based events recov-
ers replicator dynamics in the continuous limit, we need to derive the time differential
equation of the expected value of nC from the master equation Eq. 2.9. To proceed,
we denote the expected value of a variable with angular brackets. The definition of





Next, we multiply each term in the master equation Eq. 2.9 with nC and sum over all







nCT(nC |nC − 1)P(nC − 1) +
N−1∑
nC=0











(nC + 1)T(nC + 1|nC)P(nC) +
N∑
nC=0
















Plugging the expressions of transition rates in Eq. 2.7 into the last equation Eq. 2.11
leads to
〈nC〉′ = 〈T (nC + 1|nC)〉 − 〈T (nC − 1|nC)〉






















when N, nC , nD >> 1. As stated earlier, N = nC + nD is a constant in the system.
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We then define x ≡ nC
N
, and thus nD
N
= 1− x. Dividing both sides of Eq. 2.12 by N ,
we find
〈x〉′ = k1 · 〈x2(1− x)〉+ k2 · 〈x(1− x)2〉 − k3 · 〈x2(1− x)〉 − k4 · 〈x(1− x)2〉. (2.13)
For sufficiently large populations, fluctuations around the average value are expected
to be sufficiently small, and by ignoring correlations, we approximate the expected
values with actual values and omit the angular brackets. Rearranging Eq. 2.14 and
omitting angular brackets, we get
x′ = x(1− x) [(k1x+ k2(1− x))− (k3x+ k4(1− x))] , (2.14)



















which correspond to the payoffs of focal players.
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2.2.2 Individual-based rules involving 2 players in a game













k′2−→ D + D
(2.15)
Transition rates of Eq. 2.15 are
T(nC + 1|nC) = k′1 · nC ·
randomly choosing
an opponent C︷ ︸︸ ︷
nD
N − 1
T(nC − 1|nC) = k′2 · nD ·
randomly choosing





Following the same derivation from Eq. 2.9 to Eq. 2.11 and plugging the expressions
of transition rates in Eq. 2.16,
〈nC〉′ = 〈T (nC + 1|nC)〉 − 〈T (nC − 1|nC)〉
≈ k′1 · 〈nC ·
nD
N





when N, nC , cD >> 1. As before, N = nC + nD is a constant in the system. We




= 1− x. Dividing both sides of Eq. 2.17 gives
〈x〉′ = k′1 · 〈x(1− x)〉 − k′2 · 〈x(1− x)〉. (2.18)
For large populations, the fluctuations around expected values are negligible, and by
assuming the absence of higher-order correlation, we find
x′ = (k′1 − k′2)x(1− x). (2.19)
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This mean field dynamics in the IBM2 model is quadratic in x assuming ki’s do not
depend on information other than payoffs, rather than being cubic in x as expected
in the replicator dynamics for the IBM3 model.
2.3 Conclusions
We have shown that the individual-based game rules based on the payoff matrix can
recapitulate the mean-field replicator dynamics of the same payoff matrix with the
master equation approach. The individual-based game rules are general yet flexible
form two aspects. For one, we did not assign particular conditions on the value of
the elements of the payoff matrix, so the approach is general enough to simulate
various kinds of symmetric games, and possibly be able to capture the features of
environment-dependent games. For the other, the rules can be easily adapted to
both non-spatial and spatial simulations. In the following chapters, we will use the
game rules developed in this chapter to address three questions: 1) How demographic
noise and spatial extension alter the mean field dynamics predicted by the ordinary
differential equations (ODE) model proposed in [18]. 2.) How the relative speed of
environment and strategy in the ODE model proposed in [18] interacts with demo-
graphic noise and spatial extension. 3) How demographic noise and spatial extension
alter the mean field dynamics while the environment intrinsically decays while also
responds to the individual strategy [19].
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CHAPTER 3
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC NOISE AND SPATIAL EXTENSION
ON COEVOLUTIONARY GAMES
Adapted from Y.-H. Lin, and J. S. Weitz. (2019). Spatial Interactions and Oscillatory
Tragedies of the Commons. Physical review letters 122(14), 148102.
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we discussed how a tragedy of the commons (TOC) can arise
when individuals in the population play prisoner-dilemma (PD) games. However,
in contrast to standard game theory assumptions, payoffs are unlikely to remain
fixed after repeated decisions that degraded commonly-held resources. To address
this issue, a recent model [18] considered dynamics arising given resource-dependent
payoff matrices A(n) = A0(1−n) +A1(n), which interpolate between A0 and A1, the









n. This model of coevolutionary game dynamics included
feedback with the environmental state denoted by 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, such that
εẋ = x(1− x) [rC(x,A(n))− rD(x,A(n))] , (3.1)
ṅ = n(1− n) (θx− (1− x)) . (3.2)
where ε is a speed parameter and θ denotes the strength of cooperators in restoring the
environment. In this coevolutionary model, the payoff matrices A0 and A1 can have
markedly different Nash equilibria [20]. For example, when defection is uniformly
favored when n = 1 and cooperation is favored when n = 0, then the system can
exhibit a novel phenomenon termed an ‘oscillatory tragedy of the commons’ (o-TOC).
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An o-TOC denotes a trajectory in the phase plan that approaches a heteroclinic
cycle. Given a replete environment, the population rapidly switches from cooperation
to defection, which then degrades the environment. In the depleted environment,
cooperators re-establish, improving the environment, then defectors invade and the
cycle repeats. Other outcomes, including a TOC and the aversion of a TOC can
emerge given other payoff matrices [18].
We aim to simulate this coevolutionary game model with game rules derived in
Ch. 2 and assess the influence of noise and spatially explicit interactions on the
emergent dynamics of social context and resources.
3.2 Simulation details
In order to further evaluate stochastic dynamics of the IBM formulation, we simulated
the joint dynamics of resources n and social context x using N = 104 individuals. A
single time step over an interval ∆t includes N game steps followed by changes in
resource levels, n(t) according to Eq. 3.2. Hence, in this formulation stochasticity is
introduced only at the level of the individuals. Given the master equation analysis,
we define reproduction rates ki based on the current environmental state n(t) (See
section 3.2.1).
To study the combined effects of spatial structure and demographic noise (see [25])
we extended the IBM3 framework to a 2-dimensional fully occupied lattice with L
sites per dimension given periodic boundary conditions, where the N = L2 individuals
are either cooperators or defectors. The focal player is selected at random, and the
opponent is chosen randomly from the von Neumann neighborhood of the focal player.
We denote the position of the focal player (opponent) as ~rF (~rO). The focal player
reproduces with probability rate km(sF , sO, n̄) given the strategy set of focal player
and opponent, sF and sO, and the average local environment, n̄ = (n(~rF ) +n(~rO))/2.
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Environmental state dynamics n(~r, t) are augmented by diffusion, i.e.,:
∂n
∂t
= n(1− n) (θx− (1− x)) +Dn∇2n. (3.3)
The diffusivity Dn controls the redistribution of resources relative to population dy-
namics. In the case of finite diffusion, the corresponding partial differential equation
is replaced by its spatially discretized version (See section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Non-spatial individual-based model
To simulate the coevolutionary dynamics in an individual-based, game-theoretic per-
spective, we adopt the individual-based game rules derived in section 2.2.1. We
simulate N games sequentially to allow an equal chance of each individual to be in-
volved in a game within a time step ∆t. At the beginning of each time step, each
player is labeled by an integer ranging from 1 to N . In practice, three randomly
permuted series of individuals ranging from 1 to N are generated. The i−th elements
in the three random number series represent the index of the focal player, the oppo-
nent, the individual to be replaced in the i−th game respectively. A random number
r ∈ [0, 1) is generated for each of N games, and the birth-death process happens if
r > ki∆τ = ki
∆t
ε
. ki is the reaction rate and depends on the strategies of the focal
player and the opponent. We complete a time step by updating environment n with
the second order Runge-Kutta method (RK2),










n(t)(1− n(t)) (θxold(t)− (1− xold(t)))




after N games. The subscript old denotes that the value of x in ṅ is taken to be
the one before N games, while the subscript new denotes that the value of x in ṅ is
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taken to be the one after N games. A simulation proceeds to the next time step after
both x and n are updated and stops when the total number of time steps reaches an
assigned simulation horizon. A brief description of RK2 is documented in 3.2.3.
3.2.2 Spatially-explicit individual-based model
We perform spatially-explicit simulations on a 2D L × L lattice. Each lattice site
can only be occupied by a single player, either a cooperator or a defector. The rules
for updating individual strategy in spatially-explicit simulations are similar to those
in non-spatial simulations. Instead of generating three random number series, only
a randomly permuted number series is generated to represent the index of the focal
player in each game. The opponent player and the individual to be replaced are then
chosen in the von Neumann neighborhood of the focal player.
After N sequential games, the spatial profile of the environment is updated in two
steps.










ni,j(t)(1− ni,j(t)) (θxi,j,old(t)− (1− xi,j,old(t)))
ni,j(t)(1− ni,j(t)) (θxi,j,new(t)− (1− xi,j,new(t)))
] (3.5a)





(ni−1,j,s(t)− 2ni,j,s(t) + ni+1,j,s(t)
+ni,j−1,s(t)− 2ni,j,s(t) + ni,j+1,new(t))
, for Dn = 0 or 1
Σi,jni,j,s(t)
L·L , for Dn =∞
.
(3.5b)
The first step (Eq. 3.5a) accounts for change in n due to individual strategies adopted
in previous games in the same time step with RK2. The second step accounts for
diffusion was calculated with standard explicit forward-time centered-space method
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(Eq. 3.5b). The subscripts i, j denote the value at coordinate (i, j). The subscript
old in xold again denotes the quantity before N games and the subcript new in xnew
again denotes the updated quantity after N games. The subscript s in ni,j,s means
the value of n is only affected by the individual strategies but has not yet accounted
for the effect of diffusion. The subscript f in ni,j,f indicates this is the final value for n
after a time step ∆t. As before, a spatial simulation proceeds to the next simulation
step after both x and n are updated.
3.2.3 Second order Runge-Kutta (RK-2) for numerical integration
Consider the ODE system ~̇u(t) = f(t, ~u(t)), the 2-nd order Runge-Kutta (RK2)
numerically finds the solution by computing two vectors

~K1 = f(t, ~u)∆t
~K2 = f(t+ ∆t, ~u+ ~K1)∆t
(3.6)
and obtain the value of the next step ~u(t+ ∆t) with
~u(t+ ∆t) = ~ut +
1
2
( ~K1 + ~K2). (3.7)
Essentially, RK2 estimates the change over a small time step ∆t by multiplying the
step size ∆t with the averaged value of slope at the beginning, ~K1/∆t = f(t, ~u(t)), and
at the end of the step, ~K2/∆t = f(t+ ∆t, ~̂u(t+ ∆t)). The unknown value ~̂u(t+ ∆t)
is estimated to the first order, ~̂u(t+ ∆t) = ~u(t) + f(t, ~u(t))∆t = ~u(t) + ~K1. Plugging
in the estimation ~̂u(t+ ∆t) = ~u+ ~K1 back to ~K2/∆t = f(t+ ∆t, ~̂u(t+ ∆t)) recovers
the form of ~K2 listed above.
In our system, ~u(t) =
x(t)
n(t)
. In the simulations x(t + ∆t) is determined by
individual-based game rules, so we only need to calculate n(t + ∆t), the second
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element in vector ~u(t+ ∆t)







[ṅ(x(t), n(t)) + ṅ(x̂(t+ ∆t), n̂(t+ ∆t))]
(3.8)
The subscript n denotes the second element in ~Ki vectors estimating the change in n.
Being a continuous function, the change in n over a time step ∆t is approximately ṅ∆t
to the first order of ∆t. The second variable in K2,n is then n̂(t+∆t) = n(t)+ṅ(t)∆t =
n(t) +K1,n. However, x is a discretized value given it is obtained by individual-based
rules. Estimating the change in x over a time step h by ẋ(x(t), n(t))∆t does not
reflect the intrinsic demographic noise in x that we wanted to emphasize with the
individual-based model. To incorporate the demographic noise in the calculation of
n(t) with RK2, we estimate the value of x before playing games, xold(t), to be x(t),
and x after playing games in the same time step, xnew(t), to be x(t + ∆t). With
all these factors considered, the modified RK2 for calculation of n(t) in our hybrid
simulation model is







[ṅ(xold(t), n(t)) + ṅ (xnew, n(t) + ṅ(xold(t), n(t))∆t)]
(3.9)
3.3 Results and discussion
3.3.1 Non-spatial simulations
Consistent with our finding from the master equation, the simulation results of the
individual-based model involving three players (IBM3) recapitulate predictions of the
mean-field replicator dynamics model (see Fig. 3.1-bottom). Specifically, we identify
seven distinct phases corresponding to the relative the magnitude of payoffs given the
resource deplete state. The phases and their asymptotic behavior agree qualitatively
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with mean-field predictions. In contrast, if the focal player reproduces and replaces
the opponent (which we term IBM2, as is often assumed in two-player variants of
spatial games), then the individual-based simulations diverge from predictions (see
Fig. 3.1-top) as anticipated from expected mean field dynamics (see Chap. 2). There
are two notable quantitative differences in the IBM3 simulations with respect to
predictions from replicator dynamics. First, whereas mean-field dynamics predict
convergence to a heteroclinic cycle (see ‘o-TOC’ region in Fig. 3.1-top), the IBM
simulations stochastically reach an absorbing state on the boundary. Such a result is
anticipated in any finite size simulation, given that heteroclinic cycles asymptotically
approach the boundary. Second, the mean field model predicts closed periodic orbits
given certain symmetric properties of A0 and A1 (corresponding to the line with
slope (T1−R1)/(P1−S1) in Fig. 3.1-bottom.) In contrast, the IBM simulations have
demographic noise, which can lead to repeated oscillations with modulated amplitudes
(see Fig. 3.2).
In addition to demographic noise, the method of numerical integration also has a
minor effect on dynamics. With some numerical experiments, we found updating the
environment with the Euler method, which only updates n(t) to the first order of ∆t,
n(t+ ∆t) = n(t) + ṅ(t)∆t, (3.10)
could lead the system in the vicinity one of the absorbing states to be fixed in the
absorbing state (see Fig. 3.3) - such variability is another hallmark of using finite
populations for individuals and a continuous state space for resources. Although
qualitative results agree,, we will report the simulation dynamics with RK2 in all the
chapters except for Fig. 3.3
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3.3.2 Spatial simulations
Simulations of coevolutionary game-environmental dynamics reveal dramatic changes
in outcomes given spatially explicit interactions. Fig. 3.4 compares dynamics of non-
spatial and spatial IBM models with three different diffusivities, Dn = 0, 1,∞, classi-
fying outcomes based on whether there is a TOC or not (the latter we term averted,














Figure 3.1: Coevolutionary dynamics of strategies and resources in replicator and IBM
dynamics. (top) The dynamics with ‘IBM2’, in which offspring of the focal player replace the
opponent. (bottom) The dynamics with ‘IBM3’, in which offspring of the focal player replaces a
random individual. In both panels, parameter space is divided according to the sign of R0 − T0,
S0 −P0. In each section in the parameter space, a phase diagram with different A0 is shown, where
the x-axis represents x and the y-axis denotes n. Light gray trajectories are mean field solutions
and black trajectories denote IBM dynamics where arrows denote the flow of time. Visualized IBM
trajectories are the average of 100 replicates with the same parameter set, except for oscillatory
dynamics, given phase differences that can arise due to demographic noise. Common parameters
for all replicates: θ = 2, ε = 0.5, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.05, A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]; A0 varies by region. Full
parameter list for A0 in Fig. 3.7.
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Figure 3.2: Demographic noise can alter the dynamical behaviors of the
coevolutionary system. Persistent oscillations with varying amplitudes with IBM
(black lines). The values of A0 in this figure are
[
2, 1.5; 1, 1
]
.
Figure 3.3: Numerical integration of lower order can be another factor altering the
dynamical behaviors of the coevolutionary system and leads to an o-TOC. The
values of A0 in this figure are
[




Figure 3.4: Strategy-resource dynamics given spatial interactions. Colors in each
heat-map denote the fraction of averted dynamics out of 20 replicates with different
A0’s. The horizontal axis of the heat maps are S0 − P0 and the vertical ones are
R0 − T0. Each grid on the heat maps has increment 0.1. The diffusivity Dn is
showed in the title of each panel. Other parameters for all replicates are L = 100,
θ = 2, ε = 0.5, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.05, A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]. The white lines mark out
the boundary of different dynamics predicted by the mean field model. Full
parameter list for A0 in Fig. 3.8.
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The heat maps show the proportion of averted cases among all replicates. Spatial
interactions enable TOC aversion when cooperation is favored given a coordination
game context (R0 > T0 and S0 < P0, could be a stag-hunt game as n ≈ 0. See Fig. 3.4
upper left). However, spatial interactions also restrict the parameter regimes where a
TOC can be averted given an anti-coordination game context (R0 < T0 and S0 > P0,
could be a hawk-dove game as n ≈ 0. See Fig. 3.4 bottom right). This observation is
consistent with the previous findings that spatial extension can promote cooperation
in stag hunt games and suppress cooperation in hawk-dove games [26]. For long-
term dynamics, we find that oscillating dynamics are typical in Dn =∞ cases. Such
oscillatory dynamics can spiral inwards when TOC-s are averted or outwards to the
boundary. Of note, amongst IBM models we only observe a persistent o-TOC when
Dn = ∞; indicating the role of strong spatial coupling to induce oscillations. As
shown in Fig. 3.5, oscillations are present across a large range of the (S0 − P0) −
(R0−T0) parameter space. Some of the oscillations may lead to a TOC (Fig. 3.5(a)),
while others may have various amplitudes but the population persists over multiple
runs, in these cases until the end of the simulation (Fig. 3.5(b) - Fig. 3.5(d)). Given
the absorbing conditions of the stochastic model, we cannot guarantee infinite-time






Figure 3.5: The oscillating dynamics are common with Dn =∞ in a wide range of
A0. These four plots shows the temporal dynamics of a replicate with a specific A0,
and where it falls on the (S0 − P0)− (R0 − T0) parameter space in the each inserted
plot. The values of A0’s are (a)
[













5.5, 2; 6, 1
]
, respectively. 27
We further investigated spatiotemporal dynamics focusing on variation inDn given
parameter regimes with both averted and TOC dynamics. These regimes correspond
to the case where S0 < P0, R0 > T0 and where R0 > −θ(S0 − P0) + T0 (see bot-
tom panels of Fig. 3.4). The results of spatially explicit IBM3 model simulations are
shown in Fig. 3.6 for Dn = 0, 1 and ∞. Notably, all cases appear to exhibit cluster-
ing amongst cooperators and the cases with heterogeneous environmental dynamics
(Dn = 0 and Dn = 1) also appear to exhibit clustering between cooperators and
environmental resource state. However, there are markedly different types of emer-
gent spatial patterns give variation in the diffusivity of environmental resource state.
In order to assess clustering quantitatively, we analyzed the joint structure of social
















(i− i′)2 + (j − j′)2 ≤ r + 1, and A(r) denotes the number of lattice
sites within this range in both cases. We then fit the short-range components of the
observed correlation at a fixed time point to a decaying exponential, i.e., g(r, t) ∼
1 + α(t)e−r/ξ(t) given pre-factor α and correlation length ξ.
The spatial autocorrelation analysis confirms the emergence of clustering amongst
cooperators when the TOC is averted, i.e., gCC(r) > 1 for r → 1 (see black lines in
the sub-panels of Fig. 3.6). Yet there are marked differences in the dynamics of the
cross-correlation between cooperators and the environmental state.
For Dn = 0, the environment and cooperative population propagate outward
as a wave. The cooperative population spreads leaving patches of resource replete
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environments. The gCN(r) plots show that x and n can be positively correlated as
a wave initiates but negatively correlated once defectors invade and replace resource
replete environments, leading to (often disjoint) patchy distributions of both resources
and cooperators. In contrast, for Dn = 1, small clusters of cooperators and localized
resources form after initial transient dynamics. This feature is captured by the gCN(r)
analysis, revealing strongly elevated cross-correlation (see the middle row of Fig. 3.6)
as well as similar pattern in the dynamics of gCC(r) and gCN(r). We note that
these ‘gangs’ of cooperators and their environmental ‘tail’ are chased by a dominant
group of defectors (see [27] for related findings in evolutionary PD models without
environmental feedback). Finally, given Dn = ∞, the resources are uniform across
space. Cooperative clusters grow towards system sizes due to the strong spatial
coupling mediated via fast resource diffusivity. The single large cooperator cluster
expands and shrinks over time with increasing amplitude, as evidenced by the elevated
autocorrelation of gCC(r) in the bottom row of Fig. 3.6, with rapid switches in resource
state, leading to an eventual collapse of the cooperator population. We do not report
gCN(r) given the uniform distribution of resources given Dn =∞.
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Figure 3.6: Spatiotemporal dynamics of resources and cooperation. The background
color represents the environment, while a red square means a cooperator occupies
the lattice site. The empty sites are occupied by defectors. (Top row) Dn = 0, a
circular wave of cooperative population propagates outward. (Middle row) Dn = 1,
a few small patches of cooperators move around and divide. (Bottom row) Dn =∞,




In summary, we have developed an individual-based framework to incorporate the
effects of demographic noise and spatial interactions [25] in coevolutionary game dy-
namics that couple individual strategies and the environment. The IBM involving
three players in a game recapitulates and generalizes earlier findings from a coevolu-
tionary game model, including the emergence of an oscillatory tragedy of the com-
mons [18]. Spatial interactions can shift the domains in which a tragedy of the
commons may arise when compared to non-spatial models [28]. Spatially explicit
dynamics also lead to novel, coherent spatiotemporal patterns [29, 30, 31, 32, 33],
including diffusive clusters, flickering, and wave-like patterns. These joint dynamics
of resources and social strategies suggest multiple avenues for future study, including
formally deriving effective PDEs to characterize whether the system permits propa-
gating waves in the large system limit. It will also be critical to evaluate the extent
to which spatial interactions modify strategy-environment feedback in proposed gen-
eralizations [19] of the replicator framework underlying the present work [18] and in
stochastic games with feedback between behavior and public good states [34]. Fi-
nally, the spatial framework developed here may also aid efforts to understand how
microorganisms produce and utilize public goods, e.g., siderophores – extracellular
iron harvesting enzymes, as but one example of many [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42].
Given increasing pressures on limited resources, we intend to leverage prior work on
controlling mean-field strategy-environment dynamics [43] to identify ways in which





We choose ∆x = 1 and ∆t = 0.05 to ensure the stability of 2D diffusion. Stability





[44]. We use periodic boundary conditions for spatial
simulations. The scaling value ε = 0.5 was further chosen so that ∆τ = ∆t/ε = 0.1.
This assures the largest transition probability of a birth-death process ki∆τ will be
smaller than 1 given payoff matrix values in the simulations. The model parameters
are in arbitrary simulation units, and the values other than A0 are shown in Table 3.1.
The parameters of simulations in Fig. 3.1 are shown in Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.7. In
Fig. 3.1, each plot for stochastic individual-based model dynamics are averaged over
100 replicates except for oscillatory dynamics, given phase differences that can arise
due to demographic noise. The parameters except for Dn of simulations in Fig. 3.4 are
shown in Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.8. Dn is specified on each panel of Fig. 3.4 in the main
text. The axes of heat maps ranging from -2 to 2, linearly increase with difference
0.1 on both the horizontal axis, S0 − P0 and the vertical axis, R0 − T0. There are
thus 41 · 41 = 1681 grid points on each heat map. The value of each grid on the heat
maps is the average over 20 replicates, representing a total of 41 · 41 · 20 · 4 = 134480
simulations in Fig. 3.4. The parameters except for Dn of simulations in Fig. 3.6 are





. Dn is specified on each panel of Fig. 3.6 in the
main text.
3.5.2 Classification criteria for TOC and averted dynamics
To separate quasi-periodic dynamics from an oscillating TOC, we categorize a sim-
ulation as by finding the difference between consecutive peaks and valleys in the
environment n(t), δn, and in the fraction of cooperators x(t), δx. If the maximum δn
or δx is larger than the threshold 1− 2δ, it indicates the dynamics are an oscillating
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Dn [0, 1, ∞]
L 100
(x0, n0) (0.3, 0.7)




in each section on the
parameter space of Fig. 3.1 in the main text.
TOC because of the considerable variation in magnitude. δ is a smaller number set
to be 0.01. Otherwise, we then take the mean of the final 20% time series of x(t)
and n(t), i.e., x̄ and n̄ respectively. If n̄ < δ, this simulation replication is classified
as a TOC because the environment is depleted in the latter part of the simulation
regardless of what the value of x is. Otherwise, a TOC is averted.
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in each section on the
parameter space of Fig. 3.4 in the main text.
3.5.3 A brief analysis of Mean-field IBM2 System













k′2−→ D + D
(3.13)
For large populations, the fluctuations around expected values are negligible, and by
assuming the absence of higher-order correlation, we find
x′ = (k′1 − k′2)x(1− x). (3.14)
The IBM2 model is quadratic in x assuming ki’s do not dependent on information
other than payoffs. However, ki’s still depend on environment n. In the simulations,
k′1 = S(n) = S0(1−n)+S1n and k′2 = T (n) = T0(1−n)+T1n. The mean-field ODEs
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now become
x′ = x(1− x)(δ0(1− n) + δ1n)
n′ = n(1− n)(θx− (1− x))
(3.15)
with δ0 ≡ S0 − T0 and δ1 ≡ S1 − T1. The (possible) fixed points are (x, n) =
(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1) and (x∗, n∗) that lies within the unit square. To ensure
x′(x∗, n∗) = 0 and n′(x∗, n∗) = 0,
δ0(1− n∗) + δ1n∗ = 0
θx∗ − (1− x∗) = 0
(3.16)
must be satisfied at the internal fixed point.








|x∗,n∗ = [(1− n∗)− n∗](θx∗ − (1− x∗)) = 0.
(3.17)
The 0 elements on the diagonal indicate that neutral orbits are possible in mean-field
IBM2. To further prove the existence of neutral orbits in the mean-field IBM2 system,




x(1− x)(δ0(1− n) + δ1n)







δ0(1− n) + δ1n
n(1− n)
dn. (3.19)




dx = −θ ln (1− x)− lnx+ Const. (3.20)
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The integral on the right hand side of Eq. (10) is
∫
δ0(1− n) + δ1n)
n(1− n)
dn = δ0 lnn− δ1 ln (1− n). (3.21)
Combing Eq. (11) and (12) leads to
H = δ0 lnn− δ1 ln (1− n) + θ ln (1− x) + ln x = Const. (3.22)







n′ = 0. (3.23)
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CHAPTER 4
THE SPEED PARAMETER OF COEVOLUTIONARY GAMES
4.1 Introduction
In a more general form, we could write a coupled nonlinear ODE systems in this form,
εu̇ = f(u, v)
v̇ = g(u, v).
(4.1)
The dynamics of coevolutionary games we have studied in the previous chapters is
of the same form with x := u and n := v. The parameter ε represents the relative
speed of u compared to v. Because the magnitude of u̇ is inversely proportional to ε,
a small ε indicates u is much faster than v, and vice versa.
With a fundamental understanding of how demographic noise and spatial ex-
tension could affect environment-dependent coevolutionary games, we would like to
further focus on the possible effects of the relative speed of the social context dynam-
ics to the environmental dynamics. The interest arises due to the observations that
relative speed could change the features of system dynamics in some ways illustrated
below.
One of the well-known effects of parameter ε is to change the stability of the
fixed points in addition to the relative speed of coupled dynamics. The FitzHugh-
Nagumo model, a canonical set of equations often used to study excitable media, fully
illustrates the effects of ε on stability [45, 46]. The FitzHugh-Nagumo model can be
written as
εu̇ = 3u− u3 − v + Iext
v̇ = u− a− bv,
(4.2)
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and it is clear that the value of the fixed point (u∗, v∗) that satisfies εu̇ = 0 and
v̇ = 0 is independent of ε. However, the stability of the fixed point changes even all
other parameters except ε remain the same. Fig. 4.1 shows how the system dynamics
vary with ε. For sufficiently large ε, the fixed point marked with an empty circle is
unstable (Fig. 4.1, upper left). The phase trajectory starts from the initial point is
thus attracted to the limited cycle, displaying persistent oscillations (Fig. 4.1, upper
right). On the other hand, a smaller ε indicates a stable fixed point with the same
value, (u∗, v∗) (the solid circle on Fig. 4.1, bottom left). The phase trajectory would be
attracted to the stable fixed point with a smaller ε. The temporal dynamics without
persistent oscillations are shown on the bottom right corner on Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Solutions of the FitzHugh-Nagumo model with different ε. The system
Eq. 4.2 displays persistent oscillations with ε = 10 (top row) but approaches the
fixed point with ε = 1 (bottom row). On each row, the nullclines and the dynamical
trajectory are plotted on the phase plane (left panel). The solid diamond marks the
initial condition, and the empty (solid) circle stands for the unstable (stable) fixed
point. The temporal dynamics of u(t) and v(t) are plotted on the right panel. The
other parameters for the model are Iext = 0, a = −0.5, b = 0.2, u(0) = 0, and
v(0) = 0.
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In addition to the present of persistent cycles, the relative speed of different bi-
ological process can also alter other features of ecological dynamics. A biologically
relevant example of how the speed parameter matters is the time scale of the evolu-
tionary process in prey-predator models. Classical ecological models of prey-predator
systems, such as the Lotka-Volterra equations [47, 48], only consider the cases in
which evolution is much slower than population dynamics, i.e., life history traits
do not change much while the population size varies. However, this is not always
the case. For some biological systems, individuals can reproduce and die at a rate
much faster than that of change in total population sizes, so that the life history
traits composition of a population differs when the population size remains about the
same. Systems with rapid evolution have cycles of different features compared to the
classical Lokta-Volterra model. For example, rapid evolution could result in peaks of
predator leading peaks in prey while Lokta-Volterra predicts the reverse [49, 50, 51].
Although the previous paper by Weitz et. al. has shown the system dynamics
of the coevolutionary games are qualitatively invariant for all ε [18], it is not clear
whether this statement remains valid when demographic noise and spatial component
is incorporated. To study the interactions between these three factors, we adopted
the simulation model developed in previous chapters and report the results to identify
possible mechanisms in altering the coevolutionary dynamics involving different ε.
4.2 Simulation details
The simulation model of non-spatial and spatial IBM is the same as described in
chapter 3.2.1. For non-spatial simulations, a time step consists of N games in which
the focal player, the opponent, and the individual replaced by the offspring of the
focal player are randomly chosen, followed by environment updates based on the
social context after the N games. For spatial simulations, the opponent and the
individual replaced are chosen from the focal player’s von Neumann neighborhood.
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After N games, local environment not only reacts to local social context but also able
to diffuse in spatial simulations. See chapter 3.2.1 for more details in implementation
of simulations.
4.3 Results and discussion
4.3.1 Non-spatial simulations
Similar to results reported in chapter 3.3.1, the vast majority of IBM3 simulations
recapitulates the dynamics predicted by the ODE system
εẋ = x(1− x)(rC(x, n)− rD(x, n))
ṅ = n(1− n)(θx− (1− x)).
(4.3)
We again divide the parameter space according to the relative magnitude of elements
of A0 into seven sections (See Fig. 4.2) with distinct dynamics. For smaller relative
speed, ε = 0.1 and ε = 1, all the simulations agree with ODE solutions.
However, an exception rises in non-spatial simulations with ε = 10. The only
exception happens at ε = 10 and A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ] (See Fig. 4.3(a), upper-left section),
where the ODE predicts a monotonic TOC. While most non-spatial IBM dynamics
with ε = 10 and A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ] resemble the ODE solution, 1 out of 20 simulations
behaves like an o-TOC (see FIG. 4.3(b)). Although the exact mechanism for this
exception is not identified, we might be able to explain it with an intuition of the
probabilistic birth-death process in IBM3. While ε stands for the relative speed of
environment dynamics to the social context dynamics in the ODE model, it may
also be interpreted as the inverse of the reproduction rate under the IBM3 frame-
work. The difference of reproduction rates between individuals of different strategies,
(rC(x, n)−rD(x, n))/ε, is smaller as ε becomes larger. With comparable reproduction
probabilities of different strategies, the cooperators could have little but not infinitely
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small chance to invade even when the the environment is not ideal for them [52], and
thus leads to an o-TOC in a usually TOC regime.
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Figure 4.2: Coevolutionary dynamics of strategies and resources of non-spatial IBM dynamics.
(top) The dynamics with ε = 0.1, (bottom) the dynamics with ε = 1. In all panels, parameter
space is divided according to the sign of R0 − T0, S0 − P0. In each section in the parameter space,
a phase diagram with different A0 is shown, where the x-axis represents x and the y-axis denotes
n. Light gray trajectories are mean field solutions and black trajectories denote IBM dynamics
where arrows denote the flow of time. Visualized IBM trajectories are the average of 20 replicates
with the same parameter set, except for oscillatory dynamics, given phase differences that can arise
due to demographic noise. Common parameters for all replicates: θ = 2, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.001,
A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]; A0 varies by region. Full parameter list for A0 in Fig. 4.11.
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(b) an o-TOC in TOC region
Figure 4.3: Coevolutionary dynamics of strategies and resources of non-spatial IBM
dynamics. (top) The dynamics with ε = 10, (bottom) temporal dynamics of the
o-TOC arising in a TOC region. In the top panel, parameter space is divided
according to the sign of R0 − T0, S0 − P0. In each section in the parameter space, a
phase diagram with different A0 in is shown, where the x-axis represents x and the
y-axis denotes n. Light gray trajectories are mean field solutions and black
trajectories denote IBM dynamics where arrows denote the flow of time. Visualized
IBM trajectories are the average of 20 replicates with the same parameter set,
except for oscillatory dynamics, given phase differences that can arise due to
demographic noise. An o-TOC happens at the regime where the ODE system
predicts a monotonic TOC. Common parameters for all replicates: θ = 2, ∆x = 1,




As shown in chapter 3.3.2, the dynamics of spatial simulations with different ε di-
verge from the those of non-spatial simulations and ODE solution. Among all ε we
simulated, we can still observe the spatial coupling mediated by Dn = ∞ induced
oscillations with a wide range of A0 (FIG. 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: Oscillations are observed over a wide range of A0 in spatial
coevolutionary dynamics of strategies and resources with Dn =∞. (a) The
dynamics with ε = 0.1, (b) the dynamics with ε = 1, and (c) the dynamics with
ε = 10. In all panels, parameter space is divided according to the sign of R0 − T0,
S0 − P0. In each section in the parameter space, a phase diagram with different A0
in is shown, where the x-axis represents x and the y-axis denotes n. Light gray
trajectories are mean field solutions and black trajectories denote IBM dynamics
where arrows denote the flow of time. θ = 2, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.001,
A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]; A0 varies by region. Full parameter list for A0 in Fig. 4.11.
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Of all ε-s considered, simulations with Dn = 1 appear to be more vulnerable to
TOCs for ε = 1 and ε = 10. On Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6, we can see simulations with
Dn = 1 can only be averted in the first quadrant on the A0 parameter space. The finite
diffusivity of the environment could provide the basis for resolving this discrepancy.
Unlike the case with infinite diffusivity, where all individuals could benefit from a
small amount of shared enhancement of environment due to cooperation, only a small
group of defectors on the interface in contact with cooperators can utilize the enhanced
environment from their cooperative neighbors when the diffusivity is finite. The
enhanced environment shared among a small group of defectors significantly increases
their fitness. A finite diffusivity is also better for the defectors than Dn = 0 because
the defectors do not need to successfully reproduce and replace one of the cooperative
neighbors with some chance to utilize the localized enhanced environment. Instead,
the enhanced environment diffuses to the defectors on the interface deterministically
and passively, so the defectors automatically gain higher payoff, thus more invasive,
given the finite environmental diffusion.
However, for ε = 0.1, the system dynamics of Dn = 1 and Dn = 0 are not markedly
different (Fig. 4.7). This similarity could be due to that the environment dynamics
is too slow to create a gradient in n among neighborhoods when ε = 0.1. With small
‖∇n‖ values, a finite diffusivity such as Dn = 1 cannot help much on re-distributing
environment and thus could not make the system dynamics markedly different from
those with Dn = 0.
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Figure 4.5: Strategy-resource dynamics given spatial interactions. Colors in each
heat-map denote the fraction of averted dynamics out of 20 replicates with different
A0’s. The horizontal axis of the heat maps are S0 − P0 and the vertical ones are
R0 − T0. The diffusivity Dn is showed in the title of each panel. Other parameters
for all replicates are L = 100, θ = 2, ε = 10, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.001,
A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]. The white lines mark out the boundary of different dynamics
predicted by the mean field model. Full parameter list for A0 in Fig. 4.11.
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Figure 4.6: Strategy-resource dynamics given spatial interactions. Colors in each
heat-map denote the fraction of averted dynamics out of 20 replicates with different
A0’s. The horizontal axis of the heat maps are S0 − P0 and the vertical ones are
R0 − T0. Each grid on the heat maps has increment 0.1. The diffusivity Dn is
showed in the title of each panel. Other parameters for all replicates are L = 100,
θ = 2, ε = 1, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.001, A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]. The white lines mark out the
boundary of different dynamics predicted by the mean field model. Full parameter
list for A0 in Fig. 4.11.
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Figure 4.7: Strategy-resource dynamics given spatial interactions. Colors in each
heat-map denote the fraction of averted dynamics out of 20 replicates with different
A0’s. The horizontal axis of the heat maps are S0 − P0 and the vertical ones are
R0 − T0. Each grid on the heat maps has increment 0.1. The diffusivity Dn is
showed in the title of each panel. Other parameters for all replicates are L = 100,
θ = 2, ε = 0.1, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.001, A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]. The white lines mark out
the boundary of different dynamics predicted by the mean field model. Full
parameter list for A0 in Fig. 4.11.
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Moving a step forward to focus on the spatial structure, we calculated the pair
correlation function g(r) of a simulation with different combinations of ε and Dn.
The simulations focused on are picked from the section of A0 parameter space where
averted and TOC samples are mixed or where the system has non-trivial transient
dynamics (flickering clusters or several moving clusters). The simulations could lie in
the section either with A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ] or A0 = [
2.5 1.5
1 1 ], the sections in the middle of the
upper A0 phase plane (See Fig. 4.5-Fig. 4.7). As described in Chapter 3.3.2, we can
observe propagating waves, moving clusters, and flickering patches in the simulations.
Nonetheless, there are several qualitative differences to be noted.
For ε = 0.1, propagating waves are still observed with Dn = 0 (See Fig. 4.8, top
row). However, the simulations with Dn = 1 also appears to exhibit propagating
waves (See Fig. 4.8, middle row). Dynamics reveal a small patch of cooperators
moving toward a specific direction followed by a high-environment patch during a
short time before they collide and merge with another cluster, but overall the subtle
difference can be assessed by analyzing gCN(r) for Dn = 0 and Dn = 1. For Dn = 1,
where individuals and environment move with comparable speed, gCN(r, t) > 1 for
small r most of the time during the simulation. On the other hand, gCN(r, t) can
sometimes be smaller than 1 for small r, indicating the time difference between the
propagation of x and n (See the mid panel onFig. 4.8, top row). The observation of
spatial-temporal dynamics with ε = 0.1 further confirms the previous statement of
the similarity between dynamics of Dn = 0 and Dn = 1 with ε = 0.1. We may also
infer that a small ε has a similar effect on the anti-correlation of distribution between
social context and the environment as a very low Dn does. For the simulation of
Dn = ∞ and ε = 0.1, we can see a flickering cooperative cluster resembles what is
reported in Chapter 3.3.2. (See Fig. 4.8, bottom row)
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Figure 4.8: Spatiotemporal dynamics of resources and cooperation with ε = 0.1.
The background color represents the environment, while a red square means a
cooperator occupies the lattice site. The empty sites are occupied by defectors.
(Top row) Dn = 0, a circular wave of cooperative population propagates outward,
A0 = [ 2.5 1.51 1 ]. (Middle row) Dn = 1, a small ε delays the correlation between social
context and the environment, A0 = [ 2.5 1.51 1 ]. (Bottom row) Dn =∞, a large
cooperator cluster expands and shrinks over time with increasing amplitude,
A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ]. 53
The temporal dynamics of simulations with ε = 1 and ε = 10 are similar. In
both cases, propagating waves happen in simulations with Dn = 0 (See the top
rows in Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10). For simulations with Dn = 1, cooperators and
environment are positively correlated. Small clusters of cooperators emerge after
initial transient dynamics. The several small clusters could move around or divide
into even smaller clusters. While old cooperator clusters continue to move, a new
cooperator cluster could emerge and grow larger, then move around and divide (See
the middle rows in Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10). For both simulations with Dn = 1, the
cooperator clusters are all invaded by defectors at the end of the simulation. In the
cases of Dn = ∞, the cooperator clusters shrink and expand over time. However,
the amplitudes of shrinking and expanding of cooperator clusters are less than that
in the case of ε = 0.1 and Dn = ∞ despite the large oscillations in the environment
n. Considering the faster environment dynamics with larger ε, the trend of decaying
amplitudes in cooperators with increasing ε is intuitive. Regardless of similar spatial-
temporal dynamics of different Dn, there are two differences between simulations with
ε = 1 and ε = 10 to note. First, the dynamics with ε = 10 takes a longer time to
evolve because the time scale of social context dynamics is inverse to ε. Second, the
clusters of cooperators and a good environment are generally more fragmented with
ε = 10. The fast response of the environment in accordance with social dynamics
results in the highly localized environment, and hinders the growth of cooperator and
defector clusters.
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Figure 4.9: Spatiotemporal dynamics of resources and cooperation with ε = 1. The
background color represents the environment, while a red square means a
cooperator occupies the lattice site. The empty sites are occupied by defectors.
(Top row) Dn = 0, a circular wave of cooperative population propagates outward,
A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ]. (Middle row) Dn = 1, a few small patches of cooperators move around
and divide, A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ]. (Bottom row) Dn =∞, a large cooperator cluster
expands and shrinks over time with increasing amplitude, A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ].
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Figure 4.10: Spatiotemporal dynamics of resources and cooperation with ε = 10.
The background color represents the environment, while a red square means a
cooperator occupies the lattice site. The empty sites are occupied by defectors.
(Top row) Dn = 0, a circular wave of cooperative population propagates outward,
A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ]. (Middle row) Dn = 1, a few small patches of cooperators move around
and divide, A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ]. (Bottom row) Dn =∞, a large cooperator cluster
expands and shrinks over time, A0 = [ 2.5 5.51 6 ].
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4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we explored possible effects of the speed constant ε in both non-spatial
and spatial individual-based models. As found in Chapter 3, the vast majority of non-
spatial simulations recapitulates the ODE solution regardless of ε, while the spatial
interactions can shift the domains where a TOC can be averted.
Comparing simulations with different ε-s, we found ε alters the system dynamics
in several ways. In non-spatial simulations, a large ε makes the growth rates of indi-
viduals with two different strategies comparable and gives a chance for the apparently
’disadvantaged’ strategies to invade. In spatial simulations, the magnitude of ε could
further change the spatial patterns. A smaller ε indicates a slower response of the
environment, leading to anti-correlation between the social context and the environ-
ment. A larger ε, on the other hand, implies a faster response of the environment to
the social context and results in localization of the environment and more fragmented
distribution of both social context and environment. We also found that the environ-
ment with Dn = 1 could give some advantage to defectors and the system could be
more vulnerable to TOC.
In summary, we identify possible effects of ε in both spatial and non-spatial simu-
lations. However, we only tested one A0 in each section for each combination of ε and
Dn. Simulations with more A0 may be needed to further confirm our observations
and hypothesis in this chapter, and to identify the possible interactions between the
time scales of ε and Dn.
4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Simulation parameters
We choose ∆x = 1 and ∆t = 0.001 to ensure the stability of 2D diffusion and for







We use periodic boundary conditions for spatial simulations. The speed parameter
ε = 0.1, 1, 10 was further chosen so that ∆τ = ∆t/ε is smaller than = 0.1. This assures
the largest transition probability of a birth-death process ki∆τ will be smaller than 1
given payoff matrix values in the simulations. The model parameters are in arbitrary
simulation units, and the values other than A0 are shown in Table 4.1.
The common parameters of simulations are shown in Table 4.1, and A0’s for
simulations in each section are shown on Fig. 4.11. The value of ε and Dn are noted
in each figure panel.







A0 see below for each figure
N 10000
ε [0.1, 1, 10]
θ 2
Dn [0, 1, ∞]
L 100
(x0, n0) (0.3, 0.6)




in each section on the
parameter space of figures in Chapter 4.
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4.5.2 Classification criteria for TOC and averted dynamics
The detailed method to separate TOC and o-TOC from averted dynamics is as de-
scribed in Chapter 3.5.2.
59
CHAPTER 5
COEVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH INTRINSICALLY DECAYING
ENVIRONMENT
5.1 Introduction and models
In the previous chapters, our model only considers the environment changes due to
individual strategies. However, this is often not the case in the real world. Take the
classical example Hardin considered to illustrate the tragedy of the commons as an
instance, the grassland may have its own dynamics following the seasonal change that
is independent of cow grazing. Another example is the siderophore-iron complexes
as common goods for efficient uptake of scarce iron ions by microbes [36, 53, 54,
40]. While cooperators secrete siderophores to aid the uptake of iron ions, defectors
use the siderophore-iron complexes without any effort. Other than individual strate-
gies, binding to organic particles dilutes the concentration of the common good and
limits the uptake of the complexes by individuals [54, 55]. Another example would
be rainfall, exogenous to water resources as common good, which are spatially and
temporally unevenly distributed [14, 15, 16] and largely independent of individual
strategies.
Since the environment could affect which strategies the individuals adopt, an
environment with its own dynamics may shift how the composition of strategies in
a population evolves and alters the coevolutionary dynamics between environment
and strategies as a whole. To examine the roles of demographic noise and spatial
coupling in a system with intrinsic environment dynamics, we consider the model in
a recent paper [19] and adopted our game rules based on it. Following the previous
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literature [18, 19], the differential equation for strategy dynamics remains the same,
εẋ = x(1− x)(rC(x,A(n))− rD(x,A(n))). (5.1)
The environment-dependent payoff matrix is again a linear combination of A0, the
payoff matrix when the environment is depleted, and A1, the payoff matrix when the
environment is at its best, i.e., A(n) = A1n+ A0(1− n).
We consider only intrinsically decaying environment in this chapter. The equation
for environmental dynamics considering both intrinsically decaying dynamics and the
effect of individual strategies can be written as
ṁ = −αm+ θx+ (1− x), (5.2)
where α is the decaying rate of the environment and θ is the ratio of the rate of
environment enhancement by cooperators at frequency x to that by defectors at
frequency 1− x.
To restrict the value of the environment to be between 0 and 1 , we further apply
a linear transformation to variable m [19] by setting n = m−mmin
mmax−mmin . The maximum
possible value of m, mmax, occurs when all individuals choose to cooperate and thus
can be derived by solving ṁ|mmax,x=1 = 0. Likewise, The minimum possible value
of m, mmin, happens when all individuals choose to defect and can be derived by
solving ṁ|mmin,x=0 = 0. The differential equation of the normalized environment n
now becomes
ṅ = α(x− n) (5.3)
and is bounded between 0 and 1. The coupled ordinary differential equations now
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become
εẋ = x(1− x)(rC(x,A(n))− rD(x,A(n)))
ṅ = α(x− n)
(5.4)
The full analysis of this ODE model shows that it has a possibly stable internal fixed
point (x∗−, n
∗




+) in addition to (0, 0) and (1, 1).
The stability of (x∗−, n
∗
−) is determined by the product of the speed constant ε and the
environmental decaying rate α. When εα < (εα)crit, the internal fixed point becomes
unstable and a limit cycle can emerge on the x−n phase plane. Unlike the discussion
in the previous chapters that only includes variations in A0 given a fixed A1, Tilman
et. al. [19] allows variation in A1 as well. As a result, the equilibrium they presented
are combinations of elements of both payoff matrix, A0 and A1. The critical value
under which limit cycles could exist is
(√
4δ11δ00 + (δ01 − δ10)2 − δ01 − δ10
)
(√
4δ11δ00 + (δ01 − δ10)2 − 2δ11 + δ01 − δ10
)
εα > (εα)crit =
(√
4δ11δ00 + (δ01 − δ10)2 − δ01 + δ10 − 2δ00
)
8 (δ11 − δ01 + δ00)2
,
(5.5)
with δ11 ≡ T1 − R1, δ10 ≡ T1 − R1, δ01 ≡ P1 − S1, δ10 ≡ R0 − T0, and δ00 ≡ S0 − P0.
However, in this chapter, we will still focus on environment-dependent games that
converges to a Prisoners’ dilemma (PD) game when the environment is abundant.
Namely, the Nash equilibrium of games with payoff matrix A1 is defection. Because
A1 = [ 3 05 1 ] is a constant matrix through all simulations, we will only discuss the system
behavior in accordance to δ10 ≡ R0 − T0 and δ00 ≡ S0 − P0. Inserting A1 = [ 3 05 1 ]
into the criteria, we obtain a heatmap of the value on the A0 parameter space given
chosen A1 (See Fig. 5.1). Two conditions need to be met to ensure the possibility
of the existence of a limit cycle within the unit square: a) one of the internal fixed
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points exists and b) the internal point is unstable. The gray background of Fig. 5.1
indicates at least one of these two criteria is violated and thus there would be no limit
cycles. The two conditions in terms of δij’s defined, with δ11 = 5 − 3 = 2 > 0 and
δ10 = 1− 0 = 1 > 0 in our simulations, are
δ01 + δ10 > 0 and δ01δ10 > δ11δ00 , δ00 > 0
δ01 − δ10 < −2
√
−δ11δ00 , δ00 < 0
. (5.6)
The condition on top governs the right plane of the A0 parameter space and the
bottom one governs the left plane of the A0 parameter space given the definition
that δ00 ≡ S0 − P0. The region where a limit cycle could exist is almost perfectly
corresponding to the region where o-TOC is found in the ODE model without intrinsic
environment dynamics in the previous chapters.
Inspired by the previous finding that spatial coupling can lead the dynamical
system to deviate from the mean-field prediction, we aim to focus on if and how
the spatial coupling could determine the oscillatory dynamics of the coevolutionary
games with the decaying environment in this chapter.
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Figure 5.1: The heatmap of the critical values below which a limit cycle of the
coevolutionary dynamics with a decaying environment could exist. The values are
obtained by plugging δ00 ≡ S0 − P0 ∈ [−2, 2] and δ10 ≡ R0 − T0 ∈ [−2, 2] into
Eq. 5.5. The gray background indicates that limit cycles cannot exist in the region
based on Eq. 5.6. A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1].
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5.2 Simulation details
The simulation model of non-spatial and spatial IBM are the same as described
in chapter 3.2.1. For non-spatial simulations, a time step consists of N games in
which the focal player, the opponent, and the individual replaced by the offspring
of the focal player are randomly chosen, followed by environment updates based on
the social context after N games. For spatial simulations, the opponent and the
individual replaced are chosen from the focal player’s von Neumann neighborhood.
After N games, local environment not only reacts to local social context but also able
to diffuse in spatial simulations. The only difference is to include the intrinsically
decaying environmental dynamics, so the environment is updated by RK2 with ṅ of
a different form, ṅ = α(x− n). See chapter 3.2.1 for more details in implementation
of simulations.
5.3 Results and discussion
5.3.1 Non-spatial dimulations
For the two payoff matrix chosen, A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1] and A0 = [2.5, 1.5; 1, 1] that falls into
the region predicted to have limit cycles on the A0 parameter space, (εα)crit = 0.0522.
To capture the limit cycle and compare with the simulations without a limit cycle,
we chose εα = 0.05 and εα = 0.1 and picked one A0 in each of the three sections
divided by the criteria where a limit cycle could exist and the line of S0 − P0 = 0.
The vertical line S0 − P0 = 0 determines if an interior fixed point could exist in the
no limit cycle region. For εα = 0.05, we partition the value of ε and α in two different
ways: ε = 0.1, α = 0.5 and ε = 1, α = 0.05 to probe whether one of them has more
contribution of determining the existence of limit cycles when demographic noise is
presented. For εα = 0.1, the cases without limit cycles in ODE solution, we chose
ε = 0.1, α = 1.
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The non-spatial individual-based model again recapitulates the mean-field ODE
solution for all combinations of ε and α. In Fig. 5.2, we show the non-spatial sim-
ulation dynamics where limit cycles are predicted with ODE. The top panel is for
ε = 0.1, α = 0.5, and the bottom panel is for ε = 1, α = 0.05. We picked one sim-
ulation of each section to plot on the time axis on Fig. 5.3. From Fig. 5.3, we can
see the dynamics are qualitatively similar. The different partitions of ε and α do
not alter the existence of limit cycles when demographic noise is presented with all
parameter sets studied. The only difference is due to the relative speed. The left
column of Fig. 5.3 shows simulation dynamics of ε = 0.1, where the environment n
responds more quickly to social context x and leads to faster cycles. In contrast, the
left column shows dynamics with a slower response and thus slower cycles. Fig. 5.3
also shows the effect of demographic noise on the dynamics. The amplitudes of lim-
ited cycles are modulated, and the dynamics fluctuate around the fixed point rather
than staying on the same values.
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Figure 5.2: Coevolutionary dynamics of strategies and decaying resources of
different partitions of εα = 0.05 with non-spatial simulations. (top) The dynamics
of non-spatial simulations with ε = 0.1, α = 0.5, (bottom) The dynamics of
non-spatial simulations with ε = 1, α = 0.05. The dark gray lines marks the
boundary of different dynamical behavior. The x-axis represents x and the y-axis
denotes n. Light gray trajectories are mean field solutions and black trajectories
denote IBM dynamics averaged over 20 simulations. ‘LC’ is an abbreviation for
limit cycles. Common parameters for all replicates: ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.001,
A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1], A0 vary by region. Full parameter list for A0 in Fig. 5.11.
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(a) ε = 0.1, α = 0.5, limit cycles (b) ε = 1, α = 0.05, limit cycles
(c) fixed point (d) fixed point
(e) TOC (f) TOC
Figure 5.3: Temporal dynamics of strategies x and resources n of non-spatial IBM
simulations. (left) The dynamics with ε = 0.1, α = 0.5, (right) the dynamics with
ε = 1, α = 0.05. Light gray trajectories are mean field solutions and black
trajectories denote IBM dynamics. Demographic noise shift the IBM dynamics
slight compared to the ODE solution, but the IBM dynamics still resemble ODE
solutions. Common parameters for all replicates: θ = 2, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.001,
A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]; A0 indicated on the right on each row.
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For εα = 0.1, the ODE model predicts no limit cycles. We plotted the non-spatial
IBM dynamics by region in Fig. 5.4. Instead of limit cycles, the trajectory spirals
towards the stable interior fixed point In the wedge-shaped region on the A0 space.
Fig. 5.5 shows the temporal dynamics of one replicate in each region on the A0 space.
For non-spatial individual simulations, the dynamics are subjected to the influence
of demographic noise, so we can observe fluctuations around the internal fixed point.
A point arose when comparing the first row and the second row of 5.5. We can see
the amplitudes of fluctuations is larger on the first row, whose A0 lies in the region
that limit cycles could happen. Although ODE analysis shows that the existence of
limit cycles changes suddenly when crossing a critical value of εα, this observation
indicates that the borderline might blur when demographic noise is included.
69












Figure 5.4: Coevolutionary dynamics of strategies and decaying resources of
different values of εα = 0.1 with non-spatial simulations with ε = 0.1, α = 1. The
dark gray lines marks the boundary of different dynamical behavior. The x-axis
represents x and the y-axis denotes n. Light gray trajectories are mean field
solutions and black trajectories denote IBM dynamics averaged over 20 simulations.
Common parameters for all replicates: ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.001, A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1], A0
vary by region. Full parameter list for A0 in Fig. 5.11.
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(a) ε = 0.1, α = 1, fixed point, larger fluctuations
(b) fixed point, smaller fluctuations
(c) TOC
Figure 5.5: Temporal dynamics of strategies x and resources n of non-spatial IBM
dynamics with ε = 0.1, α = 1. Light gray trajectories are mean field solutions and
black trajectories denote IBM dynamics. Demographic noise shift the IBM
dynamics slight compared to the ODE solution, but the IBM dynamics still
resemble ODE solutions. Common parameters for all replicates: θ = 2, ∆x = 1, and
∆t = 0.001, A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]; A0 indicated on the right on each row. The inserted
panels are zoom-in’s of the dynamics to show the difference in amplitudes in two
different sections. The horizontal and vertical axes of the inserted panels are the
same as the main panels. 71
5.3.2 Spatial simulations
We selected Dn = 0, 1, or ∞ to combine with all the other parameters for non-
spatial simulations to probe the effect of local spatial coupling and diffusivity of the
environment. Again, we found spatial coupling alters the system dynamics. With
spatial simulations, no matter what the value of Dn is, TOCs happen in all the no
limit cycle region. Non-trivial dynamics only occur in the region where the mean
field model predict limit cycles could exist. The differences from a stable internal
fixed point in non-spatial simulations and a TOC in spatial simulations with the
same parameter set can be explained by the same reason mentioned in Chapter 3.
Because we happen to pick an A0 of a stag-hunt game, the cooperation in a spatial
game is suppressed, and the possibility of TOC increases. However, opposite to the
observation that infinite diffusivity promotes cycles in the previous chapters, we found
infinite diffusivity in spatial simulations seems to destabilize the limit cycle, if it exists
(εα = 0.05 < 0.052 for our parameters), and brings the trajectories to an internal
point (Fig. 5.6). The effect of how infinitely large Dn dampens the limit cycles is
more easy to see in simulations with ε = 1, α = 0.05 on the right column of Fig. 5.6.
With slower variations over time, we can also observe the magnitude of damping
effect decrease as Dn decreases more clearly. For εα = 0.1 > 0.052, dynamics with
Dn = 0 and Dn = 1 does not exhibit significantly larger fluctuations than the cases
with Dn = ∞, but the values of the final fixed point somewhat deviates from the
mean-field prediction (Fig. 5.7). The deviates in local equilibria could be explained
by diffusive coupling. A new equilibrium value can be achieved by balancing the
depletion (repletion) comes from the local gradient, and the concentration increase
(decrease) comes from local reaction terms. This effect has been discussed in [28].
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(a) ε = 0.1, α = 0.5, Dn = 0 (b) ε = 1, α = 0.05, Dn = 0
(c) Dn = 1 (d) Dn = 1
(e) Dn =∞ (f) Dn =∞
Figure 5.6: Temporal dynamics of strategies x and resources n of spatial IBM
dynamics with εα = 0.05, of which non-spatial simulations predict limit cycles.
(left) The dynamics with ε = 0.1, α = 0.5, (right) the dynamics with ε = 1, α = 0.05.
Light gray trajectories are mean field solutions and black trajectories denote IBM
dynamics averaged over 20 simulations. Spatial coupling shift the IBM dynamics
compared to the ODE solution and decrease the amplitudes of limit cycles.
Common parameters for all replicates: θ = 2, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.001,
A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]; A0 = [2.5, 1.5; 1, 1]; Dn vary by panel, indicated in captions.
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Figure 5.7: Coevolutionary dynamics of strategies and decaying resources of
different values of Dn with spatial simulations with a parameter set of which
non-spatial simulations predict a stable interior fixed point. (top) The dynamics of
spatial simulations with Dn =∞,(middle) The dynamics of spatial simulations with
Dn = 1, (bottom) The dynamics of spatial simulations with Dn = 0. The dark gray
lines mark the boundary of different dynamical behavior. The x-axis represents x
and the y-axis denotes n. Light gray trajectories are mean field solutions, and black
trajectories denote one of the IBM dynamics among 20 simulations. Common
parameters for all replicates: ∆x = 1, ε = 0.1,α = 1, and ∆t = 0.001,
A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1], A0 = [2.5, 1.5; 1, 1].
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The spatial structure and pair correlation functions reveal a couple of differences
between spatial-temporal dynamics of systems with and without intrinsically decaying
environment (See Fig. 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10). First of all, cooperators and environment
nearly always positively correlated in the simulations with Dn = 0. The value of
gCN(r, t) > 1 at small r most of the time. In addition, the size of cooperator and
environment clusters do not change much over time compared to systems without
intrinsically decaying environment over time for all Dn-s. This phenomena is more
pronounced with Dn = ∞, in which only the interfaces between cooperators and
defectors fluctuate. Possible explanations for both observation could lie behind the
balance between the decrease in fitness of defectors and decay of the environment.
In systems with Dn = 0, the decaying environment is unfavorable for defectors to
arise and ‘attack’ the cooperator clusters at the tail, so the systems do not exhibit
propagating waves. In systems with Dn = ∞, the global decay of the environment
also limit the spatial invasion of the defectors on the interfaces and lead to relatively
static clusters compared to systems without an intrinsically decaying environment.
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Figure 5.8: Spatiotemporal dynamics of resources and cooperation with ε = 0.1 and
α = 0.5. The background color represents the environment, while a red square
means a cooperator occupies the lattice site. The empty sites are occupied by
defectors. (Top row) Dn = 0, (Middle row) Dn = 1, (Bottom row) Dn =∞.
A0 = [ 2.5 1.51 1 ] for all panels.
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Figure 5.9: Spatiotemporal dynamics of resources and cooperation with ε = 1 and
α = 0.05. The background color represents the environment, while a red square
means a cooperator occupies the lattice site. The empty sites are occupied by
defectors. (Top row) Dn = 0, (Middle row) Dn = 1, (Bottom row) Dn =∞.
A0 = [ 2.5 1.51 1 ] for all panels.
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Figure 5.10: Spatiotemporal dynamics of resources and cooperation with ε = 0.1
and α = 1. The background color represents the environment, while a red square
means a cooperator occupies the lattice site. The empty sites are occupied by
defectors. (Top row) Dn = 0, (Middle row) Dn = 1, (Bottom row) Dn =∞.
A0 = [ 2.5 1.51 1 ] for all panels.
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5.4 Conclusion
The analysis shows that a TOC could still be averted in coevolutionary games con-
sidering intrinsically decaying environmental dynamics for a limited set of payoffs
responding to the bad environment A0. Oscillatory dynamics are also possible when
the environment is naturally decaying, and the A0 region leads to cyclic dynamics
surprisingly resembles the region where an o-TOC is predicted in the models without
intrinsic environmental dynamics. A possible reason for the similar but more stable
limit cycles could be the antagonistic the effect between environment decay and the
increase in fitness of defectors. When cooperators produce degradable public goods,
they immediately degrade and thus hinders the reproduction of defectors, who have
higher fitness when the environment is good. As a result, the system dynamics still
oscillate but with smaller variations, preventing the event of an o-TOC.
Non-spatial simulations recapitulate the mean-field prediction for another model,
further confirms the generality of the core individual-based framework. We also find
differences generated by spatial coupling, some of which are in contrast to results from
simulations without intrinsic environmental dynamics. For example, we find Dn =∞
weaken the oscillations in system dynamics rather than increasing. We also find that
the equilibrium state can be slightly different in spatial and non-spatial simulations.
Moving forward, more simulations with a larger variety of A0’s need to be evalu-
ated to draw robust conclusions regarding how spatial coupling and/or demographic
noise changes the boundary on the A0 phase plane between regions of different dy-
namical behavior. Given that we observed the shift in equilibrium state could change
in spatial simulations, it would also be interesting to see if there is any ‘interactive’
effect between A0, Dn, and ε to the final equilibrium state. This kind of systematic
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We use periodic boundary conditions for spatial simulations. The speed parameter
ε = 0.1, 1, 10 was further chosen so that ∆τ = ∆t/ε is smaller than = 0.1. This assures
the largest transition probability of a birth-death process ki∆τ will be smaller than 1
given payoff matrix values in the simulations. The model parameters are in arbitrary
simulation units, and the values other than A0 are shown in Table 5.1.
The common parameters of simulations are shown in Table 5.1, and A0’s for
simulations in each section are shown on Fig. 5.11. The value of ε and Dn are noted
in each figure panel.
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L 100
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Why is cooperation ubiquitous despite theoretical claims that cooperators are likely
outcompeted by defectors? This question remains a topic of intense interest amongst
scientists and the public. Here, recognizing that interactions are core to shaping bio-
logical dynamics [56], we aimed to frame the interactions among individuals with the
language of dynamical systems with the help of game theory and replicator dynamics.
Inspired by the theoretical tools of evolutionary game theory and replicator dy-
namics, we probed possible mechanisms of the long-standing dilemma - why is coop-
eration stable despite being exposed to the risk of a “tragedy of the commons”. The
game rules developed in Chapter 2 successfully link the temporal dynamics of strategy
frequencies to the payoff matrix. The connection between games and evolutionary
dynamics can be readily proved with a master equation approach.
Following a recent model that predicted the aversion of TOC with environment-
dependent payoffs, we adapted our game rules developed in Chapter 2 to simulate the
coevolutionary dynamics coupled between social context and the environment. The
individual-based game rules naturally include demographic noise and are easily ap-
plied to simulations in both spatial and non-spatial cases. The non-spatial simulations
confirm the game rules are general enough to include 2-by-2 symmetric games varying
with environmental states. The spatial simulations not only show that the dynamical
behavior could deviate from the non-spatial ones but also reveal rich spatial-temporal
dynamics, suggesting the critical role of spatial coupling and diffusivity. The various
spatial-temporal dynamics also open an avenue for physicists interested in pattern
formation to explore possible governing mechanisms leading to the patterns.
Moving beyond our original framework, we then focus on how the relative speed
82
between social context and environment can change the system dynamics. Although
the analysis on the coevolutionary ODE model shows the dynamics should be qual-
itatively similar across all range of relative speed, we found an exception with non-
spatial simulations involving demographic noise. When the social context dynamics
is slow, the comparable fitness between cooperators and defectors can give the co-
operators some chance to survive under the invasion of defectors [52]. The spatial
simulations, on the other hand, revealed the relative speed can also substantively
change the spatial-temporal dynamics. When the environmental dynamics is slow,
the delay between the environmental response to individual strategy can eliminate
the spatial correlation between strategy and environmental dynamics. In contrast,
fast environmental dynamics induces higher localization on both social context and
environment.
Our model framework focused on cases where environmental states are driven
largely by the actions of individuals, whether cooperation or defection. In contrast,
many systems have resources that are also driven by their own intrinsic dynamics.
Adapting a recent mean-field study of coevolutionary games, our game rules again
recapitulate mean-field solutions with non-spatial simulations. We also found the
strong spatial coupling mediated by infinitely large diffusivity has different effects on
different models. While high diffusivity of environment induces oscillatory dynamics
when the environment has no intrinsic dynamics, it helps stabilize the system from
the oscillatory dynamics and lead the systems to an internal fixed point.
In summary, we find the game rules developed in this thesis can capture the dy-
namics of 2-by-2 symmetric games of various forms in the mean-field limit, including
those varying with another independent variable such as environment abundance.
Given the generality, this set of game rules can serve as a powerful tool to investigate
ecological questions involving a wide range of pairwise interactions between individu-
als. From the physics perspective, the rich spatial-temporal dynamics emerging from
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the spatial coevolutionary games opens another door for studies of pattern forma-
tion. Although the individual-based simulations converge to replicator dynamics in
the non-spatial scenario, we have not yet derived a continuous spatial partial differen-
tial equation (PDE) model based on such game rules. Deriving a PDE model, for one,
could be helpful to identify critical parameters in the emergence of spatial-temporal
patterns observed given the various of techniques in the pattern formation litera-
tures [45]. For another, a PDE model would help to pin down the effect of spatial
coupling in the absence of demographic noise on the system of coevolutionary games.
In addition, the phase transition of a specific universality class in spatial games has
also been identified in spatial games [27]. We hope the game rules developed in this
thesis could also help address whether the same or different universality classes can
be identified in eco-evolutionary spatial games.
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